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Alessio Franci Vaibhav Srivastava Naomi Ehrich Leonard
Abstract—The collective decision-making exhibited by an-
imal groups provides enormous inspiration for multi-agent
control system design as it embodies several features that are
desirable in engineered networks, including robustness and
adaptability, low computational effort, and an intrinsically
decentralized architecture. However, many of the mechanistic
models for collective decision-making are described at the
population-level abstraction and are challenging to implement
in an engineered system. We develop simple and easy-to-
implement models of opinion dynamics that realize the empir-
ically observed collective decision-making behavior as well as
the behavior predicted by existing models of animal groups.
Using methods from Lyapunov analysis, singularity theory,
and monotone dynamical systems, we rigorously investigate the
steady-state decision-making behavior of our models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Collective decision-making in animal groups has received
significant attention in a broad scientific community [1, 2].
Animals rely on their ability to make decisions among
alternatives; many species perform remarkably well, even in
the presence of disturbances, changes in the environment,
and limitations on individual sensing, communicating, and
computing. For example, fish schools make good collective
choices among directions to forage [3], migrating bird flocks
choose efficiently when to depart as a group from a rest
stop [4], and honeybee swarms jointly select the best option
for a new nest [5]. To explain the remarkable group-level
behaviors, it has been hypothesized that animals behave
like a networked multi-agent system, using decentralized
strategies and interactions based on social cues.
Models for collective decision-making in scenarios such
as honeybee nest site selection [5, 6] have been developed
that exhibit many desirable features including the unanimity
of decisions, the robustness and adaptability to variations in
the environment, and the sensitivity of the decision-making
process to the absolute values, and the differences between
values, of the alternatives. However, many of these are
population-level models and do not provide insights on the
role of the network structure on the decision-making process.
Nor are they easy to implement in an engineered network.
Mechanistic decision-making models can be used to study
the decision-making process. In deterministic mechanistic
models, bifurcations are the most fundamental phenomena
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that capture the sensitivity of the decision-making to envi-
ronmental factors.
In this paper, we develop simple agent-level models that
realize the collective decision-making behavior predicted by
population-level models as well as empirical data and agent-
based models of animal groups in two alternative choice
tasks. Our proposed model provides a framework for system-
atic bio-inspired design of collective decision-making. It can
be used for implementing high performing control strategies
in an engineered network, and for systematic model-based
investigation of collective decision-making of animal groups,
which may lead to new testable hypotheses.
Couzin et al. [3] developed a mechanistic model to ex-
amine the role of preferences in a moving animal group
choosing between two alternatives. Numerical simulations
suggested a bifurcation in behavior from a decision-deadlock
to a group decision; this was studied analytically using a
deterministic model in [7, 8]. In [9], schooling fish data
were analyzed from experiments with an asymmetry in
preference strength and manipulation of the fraction of the
group with no preference. The model fitted to the data
showed a perturbation (or unfolding [10]) of the pitchfork
bifurcation corresponding to a decision-deadlock for small
fraction with no preference, and a decision for one option
for high fraction with no preference.
For the honeybee nest site selection problem between two
nest sites, Seeley et al. [5] developed a mechanistic model
in which the decision-making process is captured through a
pitchfork bifurcation. Their model involves a cross-inhibitory
signal that serves as the bifurcation parameter. For small
values of the cross-inhibitory signal, there is a decision-
deadlock, while for large values of the signal, a unanimous
decision is made for one of the nest sites. If the value of
each nest site is the same, then a symmetric pitchfork bifur-
cation is observed, otherwise an unfolding of the pitchfork
bifurcation is observed. Pais et al. [6] performed a rigorous
analysis of this model and drew connections to behavioral
models of decision-making proposed in [11].
Models for opinion dynamics and information assimilation
in social networks [12–17] are receiving growing attention in
the control community. These models are fairly general and
exhibit very rich behavior. However, they do not incorporate
the decision-making process nor capture the empirically ob-
served collective decision-making behavior in animal groups.
Behavioral models for decision-making in two-alternative-
choice tasks have been integrated with opinion dynamics
models to capture collective decision-making in groups [18].
However, generic mechanistic agent-based models for col-
lective decision-making have not been much explored.
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The models in this paper comprise interconnections of
linear time invariant systems and sigmoidal nonlinearities.
It has been shown in [19] that such systems exhibit rich
nonlinear dynamics, yet, are analytically tractable and easily
implementable in real world systems.
The major contributions of this paper are threefold. First,
we propose and analyze an uninformed opinion dynamics
model. We show that for small values of social effort, the
stable fixed points of the model correspond to decision-
deadlock; while for values of social effort above a critical
value, the model admits a pitchfork bifurcation and a unani-
mous decision is achieved. Our analysis relies on Lyapunov
theory, singularity theory, and monotone system theory.
Second, we extend the uninformed opinion dynamics to
the informed opinion dynamics in which some agents have
access to the external stimuli. Using Lyapunov-Schmidt
reduction, we show that the informed opinion dynamics are
an unfolding of the pitchfork bifurcation obtained in the
uninformed case. Third, we apply the informed opinion dy-
namics model to the nest site selection problem in honeybees
and show that our model captures the predictions of the
associated population-level models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We
present our models for uninformed and informed opinion
dynamics in §II. We review fundamentals of singularity
theory and Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction in §III. Our analysis
of uninformed and informed opinion dynamics is contained
in §IV and §V, respectively. We apply the informed opinion
dynamics model to the honeybee nest site selection problem
in §VI. Finally, we conclude in §VII.
II. A REALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING
We consider a set of N interconnected agents. Let A ∈
RN×N be the agent network adjacency matrix, with aij ≥ 0
and aii = 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , N and j 6= i. Let D ∈
RN×N be a diagonal matrix with Dii = di :=
∑N
j=1 aij
and let L = D − A be the network Laplacian matrix. We
make the standing assumption that the interconnection graph
is strongly connected and balanced, that is, rank L = N − 1
and 1TNL = L1N = 0, where 1N is the N -column-vector
with all unitary entries.
In this paper, we study the following distributed dynamics
as a candidate for the realization of bio-inspired collective
decision-making behavior
x˙i = −dixi +
N∑
j=1
uaijS(xj), i = 1, . . . , N (1)
where S : R→ (−1, 1) is a smooth sigmoidal function that
satisfies the following conditions:
(i) S(−z) = −S(z), for all z ∈ R (odd);
(ii) S(1)(z) > 0, for all z ∈ R (monotone);
(iii) limz→±∞ S(1)(z) = 01 (saturated);
(iv) For all n ∈ N, S(2n+1)(0) 6= 0 and S(1)(0) = 1;
(v) For all n ∈ N and z 6= 0, sgn (S(2n)(z)) = −sgn(z).
In vector form, dynamics (1) can be written as
x˙ = −Dx+ uAS(x), (2)
where S(x) is a N -column-vector with i-th entry S(xi). We
interpret the state x as the vector of agent opinions and treat
it as a measure of ensuing decisions. Accordingly, we refer
to (2) as the uninformed opinion dynamics.
The uninformed opinion dynamics (1) is a network of
output-saturated first order LTI systems1. This model may
be interpreted in the following way. The term uS(xj) in (1)
is the opinion of agent j as perceived by a generic agent
i. In particular, the saturation function models an agent’s
assessment of the opinion of other agents: opinions with
small values are assessed as they are; while the opinions
with large values are assessed to have a smaller value.
The parameter u controls this smaller value and models the
social effort: higher social effort leads to a broader range of
opinions being assessed correctly. With this interpretation,
the uninformed opinion dynamics (1) is the continuous time
version of the process in which each agent at each time
updates her opinion to a convex combination of her opinion
with the perceived opinions of her neighbors.
Heuristically, the choice of model (1) is dictated by the
following observation. The linearization of model (1) at the
origin for u = 1 is a consensus dynamics (with Laplacian
L = A − D) and, therefore, it is singular with a single
zero eigenvalue along the consensus manifold. This implies
the presence of a bifurcation with center space tangent to
the consensus manifold [20, Theorem 3.2.1], which will
generically be a pitchfork. This claim and the fact that
this bifurcation globally determines (or “organizes”) the
dynamics of (1) are proved in Theorem 1 in Section IV.
In the following we also study a version of (2) in which an
external stimuli is added. This external stimuli may represent
agent preferences or their exposure to some external infor-
mation source. We refer to such dynamics as the informed
opinion dynamics and define it by
x˙i = −dixi +
N∑
j=1
uaijS(xj) + αi, i = 1, . . . , N.
In vector form the informed opinion dynamics are
x˙ = −Dx+ uAS(x) +α, (3)
where α ∈ RN is the preference term.
The informed opinion dynamics model (3) can be inter-
preted similarly to the uninformed opinion dynamics model.
In particular, the uninformed opinion dynamics (3) is the
continuous time version of the process in which each agent at
each time (i) computes a convex combination of her opinion
with the perceived opinions of her neighbors, and (ii) updates
her opinion by the sum of the convex combination and the
external stimuli.
III. A REVIEW OF SINGULARITY THEORY AND
LYAPUNOV-SCHMIDT REDUCTION
In this section we rapidly review some of the fundamentals
of singularity theory and Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction. The
1Many functional forms are possible for which all the results of the paper
remains true (input saturation, etc.). We pick (1) to keep the illustration
concrete.
reader is referred to [10] for a comprehensive treatise on
these topics. See also [19] for a short introduction with a
control theoretical flavour.
A. Singularity and universal unfolding
A scalar bifurcation problem
g(y, u) = 0,
is defined by the zero set of the smooth function g as the
bifurcation parameter u ∈ R is varied. The independent
variable u usually models a control parameter, whereas the
dependent variable y ∈ R is a measured quantity of interest.
The set {(y, u) | g(y, u) = 0} is called the bifurcation
diagram. A zero (y∗, u∗) is said to be a bifurcation point
if the bifurcation diagram is not regular at (y∗, u∗). For
instance, the number of zeros might change at a bifurcation
point. A necessary condition for (y∗, u∗) to be a bifurcation
point is gy(y∗, u∗) = 0, where gy denotes the derivative
with respect to y. Such a point is called a singularity. If at
(y, u) = (y∗, u∗),
g = gy = gyy = gu = 0, gyyy > 0, and guy < 0,
then the singularity is a pitchfork. The above conditions are
said to solve the recognition problem of the pitchfork. At
a pitchfork singularity, the bifurcation diagram exhibits the
typical pitchfork shape ( −∈ ), corresponding to a single zero
bifurcating into three zeros.
Let G(y, u,α), α ∈ Rk be a k-parameter family of bifur-
cation problems such that G(y, u, 0) = g(y, u); and, given
any smooth perturbation term p(y, u,α) with  sufficiently
small, there exists α such that g + p and G(y, u,α) are
strongly equivalent, that is, G is obtained from g + p via a
local diffeomorphism of the form (y, u) 7→ (Y (y, u), U(u))
and multiplication by a positive function. Then, G is said to
be a universal unfolding of g if k is equal to the codimension
of g. The family of bifurcation diagrams associated with a
universal unfolding are {(y, u) | G(y, u,α) = 0, α ∈ R}.
u u
u u
Fig. 1. Universal unfolding of the pitchfork: persistent bifurcation diagrams
If the bifurcation problem g is recognized as the pitch-
fork bifurcation, then its universal unfolding G is strongly
equivalent to the 2-parameter family of bifurcation problems
y3 − uy + α1 + α2y2, α1, α2 ∈ R. Depending on the
value of the unfolding parameters α1 and α2, the associated
bifurcation diagram is (modulo strong equivalence) one of
the persistent bifurcation diagrams of the pitchfork sketched
in Fig. 1.
B. Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction
Consider the dynamical system
x˙i = Fi(x, u,α), i = 1, . . . , N. (4)
Let (x∗, u∗,α∗) be a fixed point (4), and let L = ∂F∂x ,
where F is the vector of Fi, i = 1, . . . , N . Suppose
rank L = n − 1. Let E be the projection operator from
Rn onto Im L. The basic idea of the Lyapunov-Schmidt
reduction is to write the fixed points equation of (4) into the
following two complementary equations
EF (x, u,α) = 0, (5a)
(I − E)F (x, u,α) = 0, (5b)
on Im L and ker L, respectively, and to write x = v +w,
with v ∈ ker L and w ∈ (ker L)⊥. Because for |u − u∗|
small EL is of full rank on Im L, by using the implicit func-
tion theorem (5a) can be solved to obtain w = W (v, u,α).
Substituting w in (5b), we get
f(v, u,α) = (I − E)F (v +W (v, u,α), u,α),
which maps to a one-dimensional subspace of Rn and its
zeros are in one-to-one correspondence with the fixed points
of (4).
Let v0 and v¯0 be vectors in ker L and (Im L)⊥. The
vector equation f = 0 can be reduced to a scalar equation
G = 0 defined by
G(y, u,α) = v¯T0 f(yv0, u,α).
Again, the zeros of G are in one-to-one correspondence with
the fixed points of (4).
The Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction transforms the bifurca-
tion analysis of (4) in a neighborhood of (x∗, u∗,α∗) to
the scalar bifurcation problem G(y, u,α) = 0. The tools
from the previous section can then be used to ascertain the
presence and nature of bifurcations.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNINFORMED OPINION DYNAMICS
In this section, we analyze system (1). We summarize the
stability properties of the equilibrium points of (1) in the
following theorem. For u > 1, let {0,±ys} be the three
roots of the equation −y + uS(y) = 0.
Theorem 1 (Uninformed opinion dynamics): For the un-
informed opinion dynamics (1), the following statements
hold:
(i) For 0 < u < 1, the origin is globally asymptotically
stable and locally exponentially stable;
(ii) At u = 1, the origin is globally asymptotically stable
and undergoes a pitchfork bifurcation;
(iii) For u > 1 and |u − 1| sufficiently small, there are
exactly three fixed points at origin and ±ys1N . The
origin is a saddle point with a one dimensional unstable
manifold. The stable manifold of the origin separates
RN into the basins of attraction of two exponentially
stable symmetric stationary states ±ys1N . In partic-
ular, almost all (in topological and measure sense)
trajectories converges to {ys1N} ∪ {−ys1N}
Theorem 1 is illustrated in Fig. 2. The uninformed opinion
dynamics (1) are symmetric, in the sense that the agents have
no preferences toward the positive or negative alternative. At
a mathematical level, this is reflected in the odd symmetry of
the vector field and in the fact that the pitchfork is symmetric,
that is, the two stable steady states emerging at the pitchfork
are mirror-symmetric with respect to the origin and belong
to the consensus manifold.
x i
− x j u
x i = x j
Fig. 2. For u = 1, uninformed opinion dynamics (1) possess a
pitchfork singularity at the origin. The steady state branches emerging at this
singularity lie on the consensus space {xi = xj , for all i, j = 1, . . . , N}.
Branches of the stable stationary states are depicted as solid lines. Branches
of unstable stationary states are depicted as dashed lines. The consensus
manifold is depicted as a grey plane.
We devote the remainder of the section to prove Theo-
rem 1. We establish the theorem for the case of 0 < u ≤ 1
using Lyapunov analysis. The case with u > 1 is more
involved. In this case, we resort to singularity analysis to
show that dynamics (1) exhibit a pitchfork bifurcation at
u = 1 and have only three equilibrium points for u − 1
sufficiently small. Finally, we use a result from monotone
systems theory to establish almost global convergence to
these equilibrium points.
A. Analysis for the case 0 < u ≤ 1
Consider the quadratic Lyapunov function V (x) = 12x
Tx:
V˙ = xT (−Dx+ uAS(x))
= xT (−Dx+ uDS(x)− uDS(x) + uAS(x))
= −xTD(x− uS(x))− uxTLS(x))
< −uxTLS(x)
≤ 0, ∀x 6= 0, (6)
where we have used the fact that uS is a monotone function
in the sector [0, 1], that D is a diagonal Hurwitz matrix, and
that L is a positive semidefinite matrix.
Local exponential stability for 0 < u < 1 follows by
noticing that the linearization of (1) at the origin is
˙δx = (−D + uA)δx,
and (−D+uA) is a diagonally dominant and Hurwitz matrix.
B. Analysis of the case u > 1
Lyapunov Schmidt reduction: We start by applying
Lyapunov-Schimdt reduction to the fixed point equation
of (1)
−Dx+ uAS(x) = 0, (7)
near (x, u) = (0, 1).
For u = 1, the linearization of (7) is −Lx = 0, with
L = −A + D the network Laplacian matrix and, by the
strongly connected assumption, ker L = span 1N . Let Π =
IN− 1N 1N1TN be the projector from RN onto 1⊥N and define
w = Πx and (I − Π)x =: y1N , for some y ∈ R, the
projections of x on 1⊥N and 1N , respectively. We split (7)
into two reduced equations
Π(−D(w + y1N ) + uAS(w + y1N )) = 0, (8a)
(I −Π)(−D(w + y1N ) + uAS(w + y1N )) = 0, (8b)
on 1⊥N and span 1N respectively. Since the linearization of
(7) restricted to 1⊥N is non-singular for u sufficiently close
to 1, by the implicit function theorem we can solve (8a) for
w locally around the origin as follows.
Using the Taylor series expansion in x and using L1N =
0, we can rewrite (8a) as
(−ΠL+ (u− 1)ΠA)w + y(u− 1)ΠA1N +O(ux3) = 0,
where O(ux3) denotes the vector with third and higher order
terms in the Taylor series expansion.
For u sufficiently close to 1, the matrix ΠL−(u−1)ΠA is
invertible on 1⊥N . Therefore, the first order solution is w =
(u− 1)yc with
c = (ΠL− (u− 1)ΠA)−1ΠA1N .
Invoking the fact that (8a) is odd, the next correction term
is of the third order. Thus, the solution to (8a) is given by
w = (u− 1)yc+ w˜, c, w˜ ∈ 1⊥N , (9)
with w˜i = O(uy3) and smooth for all i = 1, . . . , N .
We now substitute (9) into (8b) and obtain
(I −Π)
(
−D(y1N + (u− 1)yc+ w˜)
+ uAS
(
y1N + (u− 1)yc+ w˜
))
= 0. (10)
Since (I − Π) is a projector onto 1N , each entry in the
column vector in the LHS of (10) is identical and equal to
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(
diy + (u− 1)ydici + diw˜i+
−
N∑
j=1
uaijS
(
y + (u− 1)ycj + w˜j
))
.
Recalling that the interconnection graph is balanced, and
performing some algebraic simplifications, reduces the above
expression to
g(y, u) := − 1
N
N∑
i=1
di
(
y + (u− 1)yci + w˜i
− uS(y + (u− 1)yci + w˜i)
)
. (11)
Singularity Analysis: We now perform singularity anal-
ysis and solve the recognition problem for the bifurcation
problem g. To recognize a pitchfork bifurcation, we need to
show that g = gy = gyy = gu = 0 and gyyy < 0, gyu > 0
at (y, u) = (0, 1). Clearly g(0, 1) = 0. For brevity, we let
ς = y+(u−1)yci+w˜i and we omit the factors − 1N
∑N
i=1 di.
We have
gy = 1 + (u− 1)ci + ∂w˜i
∂y
− uS′(ς)
(
1 + (u− 1)ci + ∂w˜i
∂y
)
,
gyy =
∂2w˜i
∂y2
−uS′′(ς)
(
1 + u(u− 1)ci + ∂w˜i
∂y
)2
−uS′(ς)∂
2w˜i
∂y2
,
gyyy=
∂3w˜i
∂y3
− uS′′′(ς)
(
1 + (u− 1)ci + u∂w˜i
∂y
)3
− uS′(ς)∂
3w˜i
∂y3
− uS′′(ς)2
(
1 + (u− 1)ci + ∂w˜i
∂y
)∂2w˜i
∂y2
− uS′′(ς)
(
1 + (u− 1)ci + ∂w˜i
∂y
)
∂2w˜i
∂y2
,
gu = yci − S(ς)− uS′(ς)
(
yci +
∂w˜i
∂u
)
, and
gyu = ci−S′(ς)
(
1 + (u− 1)ci + ∂w˜i
∂y
)
−uS′(ς)
(
ci +
∂2wi
∂y∂u
)
− uS′′(ς)
(
1 + (u− 1)ci + ∂w˜i
∂y
)(
yci +
∂w˜i
∂u
)
.
Recalling that S′(0) = 1, S′′(0) = 0, S′′′(0) < 0, and since
w˜i = O(uy3), ∂w˜i∂y = ∂
2w˜i
∂y∂u = 0, we have at (y, u) = (0, 1):
g = gy = gyy = gu = 0, and
gyyy =
1
N
N∑
i=1
diS
′′′(0) < 0, guy =
1
N
N∑
i=1
di > 0.
This completes the recognition of the pitchfork bifurcation.
Equilibrium points for u > 1: The dynamical system (1)
exhibits a pitchfork bifurcation at u = 1. Hence, by the
Lyapunov-Schmidt reduction and singularity analysis, for
u > 1 and u − 1 sufficiently small, (1) has at exactly three
equilibrium points in a sufficiently small neighborhood of
the origin. One of these equilibrium points is at origin. By
replacing x = ±ys1N , the i-th line of equation (7) reads
−di ± ys +
N∑
j=1
uaijS(±ys) = di(∓ys + uS(±ys)) = 0,
which proves that xs± = ±ys1N are the other fixed points
of (1). By [10, Theorem I.4.1], the fixed point at the origin
has exactly one positive eigenvalue (corresponding to the
eigenvalue crossing zero at the pitchfork) and, therefore, it
is a saddle with a one-dimensional unstable manifold. The
other two fixed points ±ys1N have the same local stability
properties of the bifurcating fixed point, that is, they are
locally exponentially stable.
We now show that these three equilibrium points are
(globally) the only fixed points for u− 1 sufficiently small.
Let 0 ∈ B ⊂ RN be a (sufficiently small) neighborhood
of the origin where thesingularity analysis hold. Since for
u = 1 there are no fixed points on RN \B; by continuity of
the vector field on u and because |u − 1|S(x) is bounded
on RN the same must be true for |u− 1| sufficiently small.
Since the only fixed points inside B are those predicted by
singularity theory, our claim is proved.
Almost global convergence: We now show that the sys-
tem (1) is a strongly monotone system, and then use a
result from monotone system theory that ensures that almost
all trajectories of (1) converge to the set of these three
equilibrium points.
For u > 0, uninformed opinion dynamics (1) is a co-
operative2 system [21, Page 1], that is, its Jacobian matrix
satisifies the condition
∂x˙i
∂xj
(x) = aijuS
′(xj) ≥ 0, ∀i 6= j, ∀x ∈ RN .
Moreover, the Jacobian matrix of (1) is also irreducible3
for each x ∈ RN . Indeed, because uS′(xj) > 0 for all
j = 1, . . . , N and all x ∈ RN , the graph associated [22,
Definition 6.2.11] with the Jacobian matrix of (1) is the same
as the graph associated with A for all x ∈ RN . Because this
graph is strongly connected, the Jacobian matrix of (1) is
irreducible for all x ∈ RN [22, Theorem 6.2.24].
The flow of a cooperative system with an irreducible
Jacobian matrix is strongly monotone [21]. In particular, the
flow induced by (1) is strongly monotone on the whole RN .
Moreover, because −D is Hurwitz and uAS(x) is bounded,
(1) has no unbounded trajectories. Without recalling techni-
calities and definitions about monotone systems (the reader
is referred to [21]), we now specialize [21, Theorem 0.1] to
model (1).
For a given u ∈ R>0, let S ⊂ RN denote the set of fixed
points of model (1). Let C ⊂ RN denote the set of points
whose ω-limit set is in S (x ∈ C ⇔ ω(x) ⊂ S). Then,
(i) C is residual in RN , i.e., its complement is nowhere
dense;
(ii) µ(RN \ C) = 0 for all Gaussian measures µ.
Now, the almost global convergence to {±ys1N} follows
immediately.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMED OPINION DYNAMICS:
COMPLETE GRAPH
In this section, we analyze the informed opinion dynam-
ics (3) for the complete graph. We leave the analysis for a
2The exact definition of cooperation is a debated topic in the ecology
literature. We use the term cooperative in a strictly mathematical sense as
defined in [21].
3A square matrix is irreducible if and only if the associated directed graph
is strongly connected.
generic strongly connected balanced graph as future work.
For a complete graph, (3) reduces to
x˙i = −(N −1)xi +
N∑
j=1
j 6=i
uS(xj) +αi, i = 1, . . . , N. (12)
We summarize the main result of this section in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Informed opinion dynamics): The
following statement holds for the informed opinion
dynamics (3) defined on a complete graph: the Lyapunov-
Schmidt reduction of the fixed points equation of (3)
around (x∗, u,α) = (0, 1, 0) is
G(y, u;α) = −y + 〈α〉+ 〈w˜〉+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
uS(α⊥i + y + w˜i),
(13)
where α⊥ := Πα, w˜i = O(uy3), and 〈z〉 = 1N
∑N
j=1 zj for
all z ∈ RN .
Proof. We start by applying the Lyapunov-Schmidt reduc-
tion to the N -dimensional fixed point equation of (12)
− (N − 1)x+ (1N1TN − IN )uS(x) +α = 0. (14)
Similar to the previous section, we define w = Πx and
(I −Π)x =: y1N , and we split (14) into two equations
Π
(−(N − 1)(w + y1N )
+ (1N1
T
N − IN )uS(w + y1N ) +α
)
= 0, (15a)
(I−Π)(−(N − 1)(w + y1N )c
+ (1N1
T
N − IN )uS(w + y1N ) +α
)
= 0, (15b)
defined on 1⊥N and 1N , respectively. Similar to the previous
section, equation (15a) is non-singular on 1⊥N for |u−1| and
|α| sufficiently small.
Using the Taylor series expansion in x, and recalling that
Π1N = 0 and Πw = w, (15a) can be rewritten as
Π(1N1
T
N − IN )u(w + y1N )−(N−1)w + Πα+O((ux)3)
= −(N + u− 1)w + Πα+O((ux)3) = 0,
where we used Π(1N1TN−IN ) = −Π. It follows that, to the
first order, the solution is w = ΠαN+u−1 and consequently,
w =
Πα
N + u− 1 + w˜, w˜ ∈ 1
⊥
N , (16)
with w˜i = O(uy3) and smooth for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Substituting (16) in (15b) and proceeding as in the previ-
ous section, we obtain the scalar fixed point equation (13).

For α = 0, (13) is a special case of (11). Therefore,
by Theorem 1, the bifurcation problem G also exhibits a
pitchfork bifurcation for α = 0. A nonzero α has the effect
of unfolding the symmetric pitchfork.
We now briefly discuss the effect of distribution of α
across different nodes in the graph. It is easy to see using
the expression in (13) that to the first order the contribution
of α⊥ vanishes. This suggests that the unfolding of the
pitchfork in (13) solely depends on the average of the
preference vector 〈α〉. This reflects the symmetry of (12)
with respect to agent permutation.
However, the fact that α⊥ does not influence the bifur-
cation problem is only partially true. The components α⊥i ,
while not unfolding the pitchfork, move the bifurcation point.
That is, in the presence of a nonzero α⊥, the pitchfork
singularity occurs at u = u∗ > 1 even if 〈α〉 = 0.
For 〈α〉 = 0, evaluating the derivative of (13) with respect
to y at y = 0 gives
Gy(0, u;α) = −(N − 1) + N − 1
N
N∑
i=1
uS′(α⊥i ),
where we used that w˜i = ∂wi∂y = 0.
For α⊥ = 0, we get, as expected, Gy(0, 1; 0) = 0.
However, because S′(z) < 1 for z 6= 0, we immediately
see that, for α⊥ 6= 0, u > 1 is necessary to enforce the
singularity condition Gy = 0. The following example verifies
this prediction.
Example 1: For N = 5, α = [1 1 − 1 − 1 0],
and S(·) = tanh(·), numerical simulations shows that the
pitchfork singularity exists for u∗ > 1.034 
The development above is not rigorous, mainly because for
α⊥ 6= 0 the bifurcation point is not at the origin. However,
it allows us to formulate the following claim, which will be
proved in an extended version of this work.
Claim 1: There exists δ1 > 0, such that, if 0 < ‖α⊥‖ <
δ1 and 〈α〉 = 0, then there exist u∗ > 1 and x∗ ∈ RN , such
that the informed opinion dynamics (12) exhibits a pitchfork
singularity at (x, u) = (x∗, u∗). In particular, the Lyapunov-
Schmidt reduction of its fixed point equation (14) at (x, u) =
(x∗, u∗) is strongly equivalent to the pitchfork singularity.
We now illustrate the prediction of Claim 1 using an
extended example in the next section.
VI. COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING IN HONEYBEES
In the honeybee nest site selection problem, an entire
swarm must unanimously choose a nest site where it will
live as a new colony with its queen. The process starts with
a number of bees each scouting out a possible nest site and
ends with the swarm choosing the best of the scouted-out
alternatives. Each informed honeybee scout uses explicit sig-
naling in the form of a “waggle dance” to recruit uninformed
bees to commit to its discovered nest site. Seeley et al. [5]
conducted experiments in which honey-bees had to choose
between two alternative nest sites. Using empirical data, they
showed that, along with the waggle dance, the scouts also use
a cross-inhibitory stop-signal to make the scouts recruiting
for the competing alternative stop dancing. This stop-signal
contributes positively to the collective decision-making; of
particular note, it was shown to help with breaking deadlock
in the case of two near equal value alternative sites.
Consider the following informed-opinion dynamics
x˙(t) = −u1Dx(t) + u2AS(x) +α, (17)
where α ∈ Rn is the vector with entries equal to the value
of the nest site that the corresponding agent is exposed to.
We associate positive (negative) values with the first (second)
nest site and the value absolute value with the nest quality.
The entries of α associated with the uninformed agents are
zero.
In (17), u1 ∈ R>0 is the rate at which an agent commits
to the nest site it is exposed to, and u2 ∈ R>0 is the
rate at which an agent is attracted by other agents to the
nest sites. Notice that (17) is equivalent to the informed
opinion dynamics (3) defined on a time-scale u1t and with
u = u2/u1. Here, we focus on complete graphs and in this
case (17) is equivalent to (12).
Suppose honeybees have to select between two nest sites
with values v1 ∈ (0, 1) and v2 ∈ (−1, 0), respectively. Then,
αi = v1 if the bee i is exposed to the nest with value v1,
αi = v2 if the bee i is exposed to the nest with value v2, and
αi = 0 if the bee i is not exposed to any nest site. Further
assume that the number of agents exposed to each nest site
is the same. Let v¯ = (v1 +v2)/2 and u1 = 1/v¯. Such choice
of u1 means that for small values of v¯ and a fixed value of
u2, the opinions converge to zero quickly.
We first consider the symmetric case in which v1 = v2.
Following the discussion in §V, for small values of v1,
the unfolding of the pitchfork depends on the average of
α which is equal to zero. Thus, in the symmetric case,
there is no unfolding of the pitchfork. In this case for small
values of u2, the sum of all opinions converges to zero and
there is no unanimity in the group. However, at a critical
value of u2 a pitchfork bifurcation happens and the sum of
opinion converges to a positive or a negative equilibrium
point that corresponds to a decision for one of the nest sites.
The parameter u2 maps to the cross-inhibition parameter in
honeybees. The sum of opinions at steady state as a function
of u2 is shown in Fig. 3(a) and the bifurcation point as a
function of the value of the nest sites is shown in Fig. 3(b).
The variation of the bifurcation point as a function of the
value of the nest site is qualitatively identical to the trend
observed in the study of the honeybee model in [6].
In the context of asymmetric nest site values the average
of α is not zero and the associated bifurcation diagram is
shown in Fig. 3(c). In this case for small cross-inhibition
u2, the sum of opinion of agents is zero and there is no
unanimous decision. As we increase the value of u2, an
unfolding of pitchfork bifurcation is observed that favors the
better nest site. A further increase in u2 leads to emergence
of another stable equilibrium point and in this case a decision
can be made in favor of inferior nest site as well. Again this
behavior is qualitatively identical to the behavior predicted
by population-level models in [6] and [5].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we developed agent-level mechanistic mod-
els for the realization of collective decision-making behavior
in animal groups. We rigorously characterized the steady-
state behavior of these models. We applied these models to
the honeybee nest site selection problem and showed that our
model captures the empirically observed behavior as well as
the behavior predicted by the population-level models.
There are several possible extensions of this work. We
analyzed the informed opinion dynamics model for the
complete graph, and it is of interest to analyze the model
for a generic strongly connected graph. In particular, the
effect of graph topology of the onset of the bifurcation
needs to be understood. Furthermore, the influence of the
location of an informed agent in the network on the decision-
making performance needs to be rigorously characterized.
Another important future direction is to apply this model
to other decision-making scenarios, e.g., food site selection
in collective foraging and decision making in biological
neuronal networks.
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Fig. 3. Decision-making in selecting nest sites. (a) Bifurcation diagram
for an all-to-all graph with 11 agents and value of nest site equal to 0.5.
Both nest sites were exposed to four agents each. (b) Bifurcation point as a
function of the value of nest sites. (c) Unfolding of the pitchfork bifurcation
for asymmetric nest sites. Only stable equilibrium points are shown. The
value of nest sites are v1 = 0.7 and v2 = 0.5.
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